

After 1945 western Europe began to draw closer together, a process climaxed by the successes of the European Economic Community. Even Britain, long tied to her Commonwealth and enjoying a close relationship with the United States, bid to join the Common Market of continental states. Eastern Europe remained Communist, but Russian control became less effective and less direct after the death of Stalin in 1953.

Despite a gradual thaw in relations between East and West, world affairs continued to be dominated by what the German philosopher Karl Jaspers has called "the tension between the impossibility of an atomic world war and the danger, constantly kindled by small wars, that the impossible will happen." The emerging states of Asia and Africa, in seeking their own national identities amid staggering economic, social, and political problems and the pressures of population explosion, have produced a fertile field for local conflicts which threaten to upset the balance between the two superpowers—Soviet Russia and the United States. Man's opportunity for future life on this planet clearly depends upon the effective employment of some new political and psychological approach which can achieve a world-wide reconciliation of interests. It no longer seems possible for one power to pursue a completely independent course of action without jeopardizing the existence of humanity.

To many observers, the major question of our age is whether life under the constant threat of total annihilation can in fact impel men toward some form of stable world community. Under the pressure of modern civilization, must man, in the words of Jean Paul Sartre, simply "act without hope," or will he, with Albert Camus, find the strength to assert and act upon the principle that there is "only one kind of inevitability in history, that which we ourselves create"?

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

I. THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT*

Many people across the world, and especially in Europe, hoped that war could be banished from the globe forever by the League of Nations. The arms race had been an important factor in bringing on the First World War, and attempts were made to limit armaments even among the victors.

Trusting that France and Germany could live together in peace, French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand (1862-1932) and German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann strove for reconciliation after the disastrous French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. The United States of America, wishing to avoid another European conflict, encouraged their efforts and sent Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg (1856-1937) to Europe. Finally, in August 1928, fifteen nations, including the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact—a treaty to outlaw war. Why were the provisions of the pact unrealistic in the face of postwar problems? What machinery for the enforcement of its provisions and for a settlement of disputes was provided under the terms of the pact?

* *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington, 1931), Vol. XLVI, Pt. 2, pp. 2343-2347.

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The President of the German Reich, the President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of Poland, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic,

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy; . . .

ARTICLE I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

ARTICLE II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

ARTICLE III: The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

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IN FAITH WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in the French and English languages both texts having equal force, and hereunto affix their seals.

DONE at Paris, the twenty-seventh day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight.

2. MAXIM LITVINOV: 'THE ETHIOPIAN CRISIS'

Benito Mussolini hoped to promote Italy's role as a dominant power in the Mediterranean. In his view it was essential for Italy to expand its African empire. In 1935 Italian forces invaded Ethiopia and produced an international crisis. Although the League of Nations imposed minor economic sanctions on Italy, no embargo was placed on oil and Mussolini's ambitions were not severely curbed by the League's action. Before the international organization could apply more substantial economic pressures, Ethiopia had been conquered. Within months, the League recognized the *fait accompli*, and Adolf Hitler used the international crisis to remilitarize the Rhineland in contravention of the Versailles Treaty.

The following selection is from a speech of July 1, 1936, by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951), to the League of Nations Assembly. Why were the sanctions imposed by the League ineffective, and what sanctions did Litvinov advocate? Which members of the League did Litvinov imply were especially to blame for the failure of collective security in the Ethiopian crisis? What proposals did Litvinov offer to make the future conduct of the League effective?

We have met here to complete a page in the history of the League of Nations, a page in the history of international life which it will be impossible for us to read without a feeling of bitterness. We have to liquidate a course of action which was begun in fulfilment of our obligations as Members of the League to guarantee the independence of one of our fellow-Members, but which was not carried to its conclusion. Each of us must feel his measure of responsibility and of blame, which is not identical for all, and which depends, not only on what each of us did in fact, but also on the measure of our readiness to support every common action required by the circumstances. . . .

However, sooner than might have been expected, the moment came when the necessity for reconsidering the measures adopted at Geneva, from the angle of their serving any useful purpose, became absolutely clear. That moment was when the resistance of the valiant Ethiopian troops was broken, when the Emperor and Government of Ethiopia left their territory, and when a considerable portion of their territory was occupied by the Italian army. It appeared then indubitable that, by economic sanctions alone, it would be impossible to drive the Italian army out of Ethiopia and restore the independence of that country, and that such an objective could only be attained by more serious sanctions, including those of a military nature.

* "Extracts from a Statement by Litvinov at the League of Nations Assembly on the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute" in Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (3 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1953), III, 194-99. Reprinted by permission.