

Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) HOSSBACH

4. MUNICH—TWO EDITORIALS FROM "THE TIMES"*

Although a union of Germany and Austria was forbidden by the Versailles Treaty, Hitler forced the resignation of Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg (1897-) in March 1938 and annexed Austria to Germany. The western powers contented themselves with protests and rationalized that Austria was a German state which had always desired an *Anschluss*. Within months, Hitler began pressing the Czechoslovakian government to accept the extreme demands of the German minority in the Sudetenland. Britain and France were concerned that Hitler would resort to force and send the German army against Czechoslovakia, initiating a general war. Although France had an alliance with the Czechs, the French were unwilling to move without British help. Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940), the British Prime Minister, met with Hitler, who continually expanded his original demands. Chamberlain finally agreed to urge Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland, inhabited largely by Germans but containing most of Czechoslovakia's defenses, to Germany. Britain, France, Italy, and Germany—but not Czechoslovakia—met at Munich in September 1938, to solemnize the appeasement of the German dictator, an act which many Europeans believed would preserve peace. A few months later, in violation of the Munich agreements, Hitler startled the West by helping destroy the remnants of Czechoslovakian independence.

The following selection consists of two editorials from *The Times* (London) just after Chamberlain's return from Munich. What concessions had Hitler made to Chamberlain, according to *The Times* editorial? Why did *The Times* urge the British public to support the partition of Czechoslovakia in the absence of consultations with the Czech government? What, according to *The Times*, were the best procedures for enabling "democracy to survive in a world of dictatorships"? Why did *The Times* insist that "the policy of international appeasement must of course be pressed forward"?

A NEW DAWN

No conqueror returning from a victory on the battlefield has come home adorned with nobler laurels than MR. CHAMBERLAIN from Munich yesterday: and KING and people alike have shown by the manner of their reception their sense

* "A New Dawn," *The Times* (London), October 1, 1938, p. 13; "Munich and After," October 3, 1938, p. 11. Reprinted by permission.

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of his achievement. The terms of settlement in the Czech-German dispute, reached in the small hours of the morning and published in the latter issues of *The Times* of yesterday, had been seen to deliver the world from a menace of extreme horror while doing rough-and-ready justice between the conflicting claims. Yet even this great service to humanity was already beginning to appear as the lesser half of the PRIME MINISTER'S work in Munich. He himself announced it as the prelude to a larger settlement. He had not only relegated an agonizing episode to the past; he had found for the nations a new hope for the future. The joint declaration made by HERR HITLER and MR. CHAMBERLAIN proclaims that "the desire of the two peoples never to go to war with one another again" shall henceforth govern the whole of their relationships. There have been times when such a manifesto could be dismissed as a pious platitude, likely to be forgotten long before an occasion could arise for it to be practically tested. The present, it is fair to think is not such a time. The two statesmen plainly recognize in their declaration that there are still sources of difference between Great Britain and Germany, which for the sake of the peace of Europe must be settled at an early date; it is in direct relation to these that they pledge themselves to the methods of peaceful consultation, and so demonstrate that they expect to be taken at the full value of their word. By inserting a specific reference to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, as well as to the negotiations so happily concluded at Munich, the FÜHRER reminds us of an earnest of his good intentions, which the British people, in the new atmosphere, will readily acknowledge.

Civilization had been so near to the brink of collapse that any peaceful issue from the dispute of the last months would have been an overwhelming relief; but close examination of the Munich terms, in particular of the geographical adjustments, shows that they constitute not only a settlement but a hopeful settlement. That they should be bitterly resented in Czechoslovakia must add to the profound sympathy which has always been felt in England with one of the smaller and, as it seemed to many, the more promising countries emerging from the Peace Treaties. Yet the loss of the Sudeten territories had long been unavoidable, nor was it desirable that it should be avoided. That was the opinion not only of all who believed in the theory of self-determination, but of LORD RUNCIMAN, who had acquired, from a position of unique and informed detachment, an intimate knowledge of the whole problem in practice. At any rate—the Prague Government, the only dissident, having been induced to acquiesce in secession—the issue was narrowed down to finding the means for an orderly execution of an agreed plan. That on such an issue the whole world should be plunged into war was the monstrous prospect that had to be contemplated until less than three days ago. It would inevitably have been realized if HERR HITLER had insisted on a spectacular "conquest" of the Sudetenland by German troops. The Czechs would certainly have resisted in arms, nor would any Power have had the right to attempt to dissuade them. France would have been drawn in by direct obligations to Czechoslovakia: Great Britain and the Soviet Union would have been certain to come to the help of France; and so the widening conflict would have involved all those peoples throughout the world who had watched with ever-increasing revulsion the development of brutal methods of

national aggrandisement, and thought that the time had come to make a stand against them.

These methods have been publicly renounced by their principal exponents, to whom the peace loving peoples should be ready to give full credit for their professions. But, at the moment when the current racing towards the precipice seemed irresistible, it was the leadership of the BRITISH PRIME MINISTER that showed how immense were the forces ranged on the side of reason against violence. The gathering urgency of persuasion was reinforced by unmistakable proofs of resolution for defence. France mobilized her army and manned her impregnable lines. Preparation in England, though slower in starting, as is the national habit, became at the crucial moment universal and formidable. The Fleet was mobilized; the anti-aircraft forces were brought into readiness; and civilians, taking post for emergency under voluntary as well as official schemes, showed plainly that the nation would not flinch. The Dominions were prompt to affirm their unanimity with the Mother Country. These things were not a threat, nor is it to be supposed that the GERMAN CHANCELLOR would yield to threats, but there is no doubt that the evidence that MR. CHAMBERLAIN offered concession from strength and not from weakness won him a respect that might not otherwise have been accorded. Meanwhile other authoritative voices were uplifted for peace: the PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES spoke out for humanity, and the ITALIAN DUCE, responding to the PRIME MINISTER'S leadership, acknowledged that peace is a supreme interest to dictators as to other national rulers. HERR HITLER deferred, as no man need be ashamed of doing, to the protest of the whole world against war.

This was the crucial moment. That peace would follow the Munich negotiations was almost a foregone conclusion once a dictator had made the difficult renunciation of consenting to treat after he had announced his last word. The message so dramatically brought to MR. CHAMBERLAIN in the House of Commons marked the true claims and ended the threat of war. In the upshot both sides have made concessions. HERR HITLER has yielded important points of substance, consenting, it seems, to modify in a number of places the new frontiers that he claimed in the Godesberg memorandum. A dictator could hardly recede from the intention so loudly proclaimed of at least entering his new territories to-day; but the German troops will make a "token" entry, and only move by defined stages occupying several days, up to the limits agreed. By granting so much the Czechs suffer no practical loss, and they gain much by the acceptance of international control for the plebiscites that are to be held in areas of mixed race.

By the terms thus concluded the most dangerous threat of war in Europe is at last removed, and by the joint declaration we are given the hope that others will be peacefully eliminated. That twofold achievement, by common consent, we owe first and foremost to the PRIME MINISTER. Had the Government of the United Kingdom been in less resolute hands it is as certain as it can be that war, incalculable in its range, would have broken out against the wishes of every people concerned. The horror of such a catastrophe was not least in Germany. So much is clear from the immense popular enthusiasm with which MR. CHAMBERLAIN was greeted on each of his three visits; a crowd of that disciplined nation does not break through a police cordon to acclaim a foreign statesman

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out of conventional politeness. Indeed these visits seem to have increased the FÜHRER's understanding of his own people's sentiments, with a definite effect upon his policy. Let us hope that he may go on to see the wisdom of allowing them at all times to know the sentiments of other peoples instead of imposing between them a smoke-screen of ignorance and propaganda. For our own nation it remains to show our gratitude to MR. CHAMBERLAIN, chiefly by learning the lessons taught by the great dangers through which we have been so finely led—that only a people prepared to face the worst can through their leaders cause peace to prevail in a crisis; but that the threat of ruin to civilization will recur unless injustices are faced and removed in quiet times, instead of being left to fester until it is too late for remedy. If these manifest truths, always recognized yet so seldom applied, are allowed to guide the diplomacy of the coming months, then we may at last expel from men's minds the deadly doctrine of preventive war and labour with confidence for a preventive peace.

MUNICH AND AFTER

The message addressed by the KING to the nation this morning closes in the right mood of reverent thanksgiving a period of incalculable peril. And a week end that has brought seclusion even to the PRIME MINISTER, who was able to escape for a few hours to Chequers on Saturday, has given the whole country a pause for reflection, the results of which will find their most important expression in Parliament this afternoon and thereafter. This period of more leisurely consideration has certainly not diminished the importance of the events that culminated at Munich on Thursday night. The volume of applause for MR. CHAMBERLAIN, which continues to grow throughout the globe, registers a popular judgment that neither politicians nor historians are likely to reverse. Meanwhile German troops have crossed and obliterated a part of the frontier created at Versailles. Their token entry into the Sudetenland has been orderly in manner and limited in extent; since they have entered only the country of their kinsmen, they have been received with popular acclamation. The Czech troops and officials who withdrew before their coming did so with sullen resignation, as was natural. But even the universal sympathy for a people who have made a great sacrifice of pride and some surrender of material interest must not omit to contrast this bloodless transfer of authority with what might have been the alternative—a savage swarming of armies over a country that war could not have saved and even a victorious peace would never have reconstituted in its old form. Much as the Czechs have sacrificed, they also share in the universal deliverance.

After so great an outpouring of thankfulness as filled the first hours after the settlement was announced, some reaction was only to be expected. The removal of the threat of war has already released controversy on the platform, nor was it ever to be supposed that the unanimity of the people would be maintained at its recent level of enthusiasm and completeness. In Parliament to-day there will certainly be abundant criticism: the Houses would be failing in their function if there were not. There are still lacunae in the story of the last weeks to be filled in; its manifold implications for the future must needs cause divergence of opinion. The resignation of a Minister shows that another side of the

question has been raised even within the Cabinet. But, if Parliament is truly to represent the people, there can surely be nothing like a vote of censure—and certainly not from the Labour Party. The peace concluded at Munich is a peace dictated at bottom by the peoples who would have suffered in case of war; and not least insistent, though with difficulty articulate, were the German people. One fundamental truth that MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S daring diplomacy brought into the light was this—that even in a totalitarian State the people will have their influence in the last resort upon the party. The man who has arrested universal destruction by appealing to that truth need not fear that in his own country the cavillings of party will outweigh the people's gratitude.

But, even if there is the inevitable reaction, there must be no retrograde step. Relief from intolerable strain cannot be followed by mere relapse into inertia. The lessons of the crisis are plain and urgent. The policy of international appeasement must of course be pressed forward, working through the peoples, who have shown that they desire it, and whose life depends on it. There must be appeasement not only of the strong but of the weak—of the State that has allowed itself to be weakened for the common good. Czechoslovakia has desired well of humanity, and it should be a first international responsibility not only to guarantee the contracted frontiers, but also to assist in solving the new problems that the settlement has imposed upon her. As between the greater Powers the field for necessary appeasement is wide. It may be hoped that there is truth in the rumours, first that the breach between France and Italy will shortly be closed, and afterwards that Great Britain, France, and Italy together may settle the other perilous problems concerning their interests and activities in the Mediterranean. If at the same time the declaration of MR. CHAMBERLAIN and HERR HITLER, at present bilateral, can be expanded to become in effect multi-lateral, the peoples of Western and Central Europe, for what declarations are worth, may have a new peace treaty without a new war.

But with the policy of appeasement must go the policy of preparation—preparation not so much for war as against war, since no nation can afford to be without its essential shield so long as other nations remain heavily armed. So much is clear from the movement of last week's negotiations—that the scale did not begin to tip in favour of peace until MR. CHAMBERLAIN was able to point with one hand to a mobilized Navy and a nation aroused to defence while he offered conciliation with the other. This awakening of the national spirit in the last fortnight has unquestionably been another determining factor in the crisis. Not only the universal rally to the call of authority in matters of self-defence, but the queues of young men at the recruiting stations of every branch of the fighting Services, have been worthy of the tradition of 1914. These things are taken for granted by our own people, having been repeated as a matter of course at every crisis that required them; but they always come as a surprise to foreign nations. In case of war we know—but the rest of the world does not know—that the entire people, with insignificant exceptions, will wish to serve the State. Having lived through the last month, they will surely be ready to give expression to this spirit lest a similar emergency should recur.

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last Saturday, then one of the first steps Parliament would have had to take would certainly have been to call on every subject, according to his capacity, to place his services at the disposal of his country. These services would have been given cheerfully; but it might have been too late. What is now required, as an essential precaution on which peace may some day depend, is such an organization of the man-power and woman-power of the nation as will enable us all to know in advance, and prepare for, the part that we shall play in emergency. To undertake some service should be compulsory; within such a scheme the tradition, rightly cherished, of the volunteer system should survive even the strain of war. The popular response last week to the call of the A.R.P. service was admirable, but it seemed a little to overshadow the rest. There is a vast complexity of other duties for civilians, as we learnt twenty years ago; our organization should provide for them all, and A.R.P. would fall into its proper place among them. Members of Parliament—and particularly those who are most ardent for "standing up to the dictators"—have an opportunity now, which they cannot in logic reject, of translating their professions into practice. It is not words alone, but hard work and self-sacrifice that will enable democracy to survive in a world of dictatorships, which have proved themselves at least to be capable of achieving their ends by different methods. And it is only through these same qualities of hard work and self-sacrifice that the world will reach the further goal, which is known to be MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S dearest ambition, of an era when the race in armaments will be seen for the madness that it is and will be abandoned because it has ceased even to be profitable.

5. THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT*

Shortly before the First World War, Count von Schlieffen had meticulously prepared a plan of operations in the event of war. Assuming that Germany would be faced with a war on two fronts, Schlieffen had planned to secure a rapid initial victory in the west. But Schlieffen's timetable for the rapid capture of Paris failed, and German armies found themselves bogged down on both the eastern and western fronts. Adolf Hitler resolved not to be caught in a two-front war, and he was able to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939. What advantages did the Soviet Union gain by signing a ten-year non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany? What concessions did Hitler require from the Russians both in the pact itself and in the accompanying secret protocol? What "further political events" did Hitler clearly have in mind when he negotiated the second clause of the secret protocol?

TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Treaty of Neutrality, which was concluded between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in April 1926, have reached the following agreement:

* "Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (Publications of the Department of State, No. 6462; Washington, 1956), Series D, VII, 245-47.